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1ABSTRACT
This paper looks into recent developments in the EU regulation of geographical indications: the repeal of
Regulation 2081/92 on geographical indications and the passage of Regulation 510/2006, following the WTO
Panel Report on the United States’ complaint against the European Union and Regulation 2081/92. The
Panel Report and its consequences on EU GI legislation demonstrate some of the fundamental tensions
between the EU and U.S. perspectives on whether and how geographical indications should be protected, at
both the national and international level.
2When can a salmon be deemed a Scottish farmed salmon? When can a blue-veined, pungently smelly,
tangy, slightly crumbly cheese be called Roquefort, and when can it be called Gorgonzola? These questions
are not just the province of foodies, food aﬁcionados, and food snobs; they are also the subject of heated
international debates over the protection of geographical indications (“GIs”), names used on food products
to indicate they have a speciﬁc geographical origin. The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights (“TRIPS Agreement”), the main international instrument governing intellectual property
rights (which includes geographical indications), deﬁnes geographical indications as “identify[ing] a good
as originating in the territory of a member or region nor locality in that territory where a given quality,
reputation or other characteristic of the good is essentially attributable to its geographical origin.”1
While TRIPS deﬁnes and governs geographical indications, it does not create a speciﬁc regime for regulating
them,2 leaving room for WTO Members to devise their own regimes, and inevitably resulting in cultural,
economic, and legal clashes among them.3 In this increasingly globalized world, trade protections and
intellectual property rights in one nation or region can signiﬁcantly aﬀect the rights of other nations and
their citizens. Today, arguably the most signiﬁcant combatants in the ﬁght over GIs are the United States
and the European Union, a contest that commentators have characterized as a “New World” (United States)
versus “Old World” (European Union) clash of civilizations.4
1Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 1994, art. 22(1), 1869 U.N.T.S. 299, 33 I.L.M.
1197 [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement].
2See Bernard O’Connor, Sui Generis Protection of Geographical Indications, 9 Drake J. Agric. L. 359, 360 (2004). During
the TRIPS negotiations, WTO Members could not reach a consensus on the appropriate level and type of GI protection or,
indeed, on whether GIs should be protected at all. See Irene Calboli, Expanding the Protection of Geographical Indications of
Origin Under TRIPS: “Old” Debate or “New” Opportunity”?, 10 Marq. Intell. Prop. L. Rev. 181, 183 (2006).
3See, e.g., Stacy D. Goldberg, Who Will Raise the White Flag? The Battle Between the United States and the European
Union Over the Protection of Geographical Indications, 22 U. Pa. J. Int’l Econ. L. 107, 141 – 44 (2001); Frances G. Zacher,
Pass the Parmesan: Geographic Indications in the United States and the European Union—Can There Be Compromise?, 19
Emory Int’l L. Rev. 427, 427 – 28 (2005) (“More than a ﬁght over language, the dispute over this type of intellectual
property protection has serious economic and cultural implications for both the United States and the European Union.”).
4Disagreement has broken down along “Old World” (Europe) and “New World” (United States) lines, with the European
countries supporting strong GI-speciﬁc protection and the United States arguing that trademark law provided an adequate means
of protection. See Bernard O’Connor, supra note 2; Eva Gutierrez, Geographical Indicators: A Unique European Perspective
on Intellectual Property, 29 Hastings Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 29, 34 (2005); Lina Mont´ en, Geographical Indications of
3The U.S. position is that GIs are adequately protected under trademark law, and thus do not need a
separate protection regime, both on a national and international level. Currently in the United States,
geographical indications are regulated by certiﬁcation marks, provided for in the Lanham Act,5 the United
States’ trademark legislation. Among other things, certiﬁcation marks can be used to indicate the origin
of a product, and both U.S. and international applicants are free to seek certiﬁcation.6 Certiﬁcation marks
diﬀer from trademarks primarily in that they are not exclusive trademarks; they are available to use by all
producers who meet the standards established by the owner of the mark (who cannot be such a producer).7
The European Union, by contrast, has had a separate Union-wide regime for protecting GIs since July 14,
1992, when the Council of Ministers, exercising its authority under Article 43 of the EEC Treaty (what is
now Article 37 of the EC Treaty8), passed EC Council Regulation (EEC) No. 2081/92 on the protection
of geographic indications and designations of origin for agricultural products and foodstuﬀs (“Regulation
2081/92”).9 On March 20, 2006, the European Union’s Council of Ministers repealed Regulation 2081/92 and
replaced it with a slightly amended Council Regulation (EC) No. 510/2006 on the protection of geographic
indications and designations of origin for agricultural products and foodstuﬀs (“Regulation 510/2006”).10
This paper examines these two regulations and the United States’ WTO Complaint and the ensuing WTO
Panel Report, which brought about the repeal of 2081/92 and the passage of 510/2006, and it looks at how
the most recent ﬁght between these economic and political giants has played out.
Origin: Should They Be Protected and Why?—An Analysis of the Issue from the U.S. and EU Perspectives, 22 Santa Clara
Computer & High Tech. L.J. 315, 315, 334 (2006).
515 U.S.C. §§ 1051 et seq (1946).
6Products bearing certiﬁcation marks include Idaho potatoes and Roquefort cheese. See Lillian V. Faulhaber, Cured Meat
and Idaho Potatoes: A Comparative Analysis of European and American Protection and Enforcement of Geographic Indications
of Foodstuﬀs, 11 Colum. J. Eur. L. 623, 646 (2005).
7For a general discussion of certiﬁcation marks, see Lillian V. Faulhaber, supra note 6, at 645 – 49 (2005).
8Article 37 of the EC Treaty deals with a common agricultural policy. Treaty Establishing the European Community, Dec.
24, 2002, O.J. (C 325).
9Council Regulation 2081/92, 1992, O.J. (L 208) [hereinafter Regulation 2081/92]. Note that this Council Regulation is
separate from the Council Regulation for wine and spirits; Regulation 2081/92 deals only with foodstuﬀs.
10Council Regulation 510/2006, 2006, O.J. (L 93) [hereinafter Regulation 510/2006].
4I. Regulation 2018/92
Regulation 2018/92 was designed to harmonize the use and control of geographic indications across the Eu-
ropean Union.11 Prior to its passage, there was no EU-wide regulation of geographic indications; regulation
and enforcement was handled on a national level by the individual Member States, and as a result, geographic
indications had practical application only in the countries where they were adopted, absent agreements to
extend protection to other countries.12 Such agreements were formed, both internationally and bilaterally,
to create some reciprocity and harmony among the multiple regulation regimes.13
The preamble to Regulation 2081/92 raises other reasons, alongside harmonization, why the regulation
of geographical indications should be accomplished at the European Union level, rather than the state
level, including: balancing supply and demand by diversifying agricultural production; beneﬁting the rural
economy; meeting the increasing consumer interest in quality—rather than quantity—of foodstuﬀs and
particularly in foodstuﬀs with identiﬁable geographic origins; and empowering consumers to make informed
choices.14 Boiled down, the European Union has aimed to serve two broad purposes in protecting GIs: one,
beneﬁting consumers and their ability to make informed choices, and two, protecting local producers in a
tough global market.
11The preamble to the regulation states in part: “Whereas, however, there is diversity in the national practices for implement-
ing registered designations or [sic] origin and geographical indications; whereas a Community approach should be envisaged;
whereas a framework of Community rules on protection will permit the development of geographical indications and designations
of origin since, by providing a more uniform approach, such a framework will ensure fair competition between the producers
of products bearing such indications and enhance the credibility of the products in the consumers’ eyes.” Regulation 2018/92,
preamble.
12Faulhaber, supra note 6, at 626.
13Id. at 628 – 29. Faulhaber describes how the 1951 International Convention on the Use of Designations of Origins and
Names for Cheeses (the Stresa Convention) and the 1958 Lisbon Agreement for the Protection of Appellations of Origin and
their International Registration were responses to the “problems inherent in the existence of multiple regimes.” Id. at 628. The
former prohibited, among other things, false information about the origin of cheeses, id., and the latter created an international
registration system for appellations of origins (“AOCs”), id. at 629, which are granted only when products are processed in the
same region from which their raw agricultural commodities came, id. at 626.
14Regulation 2081/92, supra note 9, preamble.
5Two diﬀerent types of geographical indication are protected under Regulation 2081/92: protected designa-
tions of origin (“PDOs”) and protected geographical indications (“PGIs”).15 Although the regulation draws
this deﬁnitional distinction, the procedures and protections of the regulation apply to both types equally,16
thus this paper will refer to both with the general term geographical indications, or GIs. The distinction
has signiﬁcance primarily in terms of what label (PDO or PGI) is aﬃxed to products protected under the
regulation. Only products meeting the requirements of this regulation may bear such labels.17
The following discussion describes the provisions of the now-repealed Regulation 2081/92.
A. Applying for GI Protection Under Regulation 2081/92
Eligible applicants for GI protection are associations of “producers and/or processors working with the same
agricultural product or foodstuﬀ”18 and, in limited instances, natural or legal persons.19 To apply, the
applicant must draft a product speciﬁcation, which includes, among other things, the name of the product
and its geographical origin, a description of the product, a deﬁnition of the geographical area, evidence
showing that the product comes from that geographic area, and information about inspection structures
required later in the regulation.20 The applicant then sends the application to the EU Member State where
the geographical area is located. The government is then obligated to conﬁrm that the application is justiﬁed,
and if it determines that the application meets the regulation’s requirements, it will forward the application
15Regulation 2081/92, supra note 9, preamble, arts. 2(2)(a) – (b).
16See Faulhaber, at 630, 630 n. 48. For general discussion about the distinctions between the two categories, see, for example,
id. The regulation excludes GI protection for terms that have become generic. Regulation 2081/92, supra note 9, art. 3. The
three most important factors in determining whether a name had become generic were: 1) “the existing situation in the Member
State in which the name originates and in areas of consumption”; 2) “the existing situation in other Member States”: 3) “the
relevant national or Community laws.” Id., art. 3(1).
17Regulation 2081/92, supra note 9, art. 8.
18Id. art. 5(1).
19Id. art. 5(2).
20Id. art. 4(2)(a) – (i).
6to the Commission.21
Within six months of receiving the application, the Commission must verify that the product speciﬁcation
is complete, and if the Commission then determines that the name qualiﬁes for GI protection, it will publish
the registration in the Oﬃcial Journal of the European Communities.22 During this transitional period,
while the application is under determination with the Commission, the Member State can oﬀer temporary
GI protection on a national level (but not a Community level) to the product.23
B. Objecting to Applications for GI Protection
Up to six months following publication in the Oﬃcial Journal, a Member State can object to the registration
of the GI.24 Any “legitimately concerned” natural or legal person may also object, by submitting a statement
to the relevant authority of the Member State in which he or she resides or is a commercial establishment.
The Member State is then obliged under the regulation to consider the statement and, if the statement is
deemed valid, ﬁle an objection in a timely manner.25 The regulation provides three grounds for objecting to
a registration: 1) non-satisfaction of the requirements of either a PDO or a PGI; 2) jeopardy to an existing
partly identical name or trademark, or to a product that has legally be on the market for the preceding ﬁve
years; or 3) indication that the name is generic.26
C. Compliance and Inspection Structures
21Id. art. 5(3) – (4).
22Id. art. 6(1) – (2). This publication resembles the way that U.S. agencies will publish notice of proposed rulemaking in
the Federal Register.
23Regulation 2081/92, supra note 9, art. 5, as amended by Council Regulation (EC) No. 535/97, 1997, O.J. (L 83).
24Regulation 2081/92, supra note 9, art. 7.
25Id. art. 7(3).
26Id. art. 7(4).
7Regulation 2081/92 requires Member States to establish at their own cost27 inspection structures, whose
purpose is to conﬁrm that products using protected GI names comply with their product speciﬁcations.28 The
regulation provides some ﬂexibility to Member States in designing their inspection structures: for example,
the structure may consist of one or more authorities; it may be either a public or private body;29 and in
some instances, the designated authority may use the inspection services of another entity.30 However, the
regulation does require that inspection structures “oﬀer adequate guarantees of objectivity and impartiality
...and have permanently at their disposal the qualiﬁed staﬀ and resources necessary to carry out inspection
of agricultural products and foodstuﬀs bearing a protected name.”31
D. Registration of GIs from Non-EU Countries
Geographical indications from countries outside the European Union may also be protected under Regulation
2081/92, provided the requirements of Article 12 are satisﬁed. Article 12(1) provides:
Without prejudice to international agreements, this Regulation may apply to an agricultural product
or foodstuﬀ from a third country provided that:
-
the third country is able to give guarantees identical or equivalent to
those referred to in Article 4,
-
the third country concerned has inspection arrangements and a right to
objection equivalent to those laid down in this Regulation,
27Id. art. 10(7).
28Id. art. 10. The regulation gave each Member State, at the time of passage, six months to comply. Countries that joined
the European Union after the date of passage were given six months to comply starting from the date of accession. Id.




the third country concerned is prepared to provide protection equivalent
to that available in the Community to corresponding agricultural products for foodstuﬀs
coming from the Community.32
The scope of this article’s coverage—whether “third country” includes all non-EU countries or just non-EU
countries that are not members of the WTO—and the equivalence and reciprocity requirements were focal
points for debate between the United States and the European Union at the WTO, as described below.
Article 12a describes the application procedure for names referring to regions outside the European Union:
the applicant sends the registration application, including the product speciﬁcation, to the country where
the geographical area is located, and that country is responsible verifying the application and transmitting
it to the Commission. The procedure is nearly identical in format to that used for GIs from EU Member
States, except here the participation of non-EU governments, which are under no obligation to comply with
EU laws, is required. The objection procedures, found in Articles 12b and 12d, are likewise similar to those
described for EU nationals, except that a non-EU national seeking to object to a registration must petition
his own government to ﬁle the objection, and it must be ﬁled in a an oﬃcial EU language or accompanied
by a translation.
II. The United States and The European Union Clash at the WTO
In 1999, the United States requested WTO consultations with the European Union33 over Regulation
2081/92.34 In August 2003, after the consultations failed to resolve the dispute, the United States requested
33The oﬃcial name used by the WTO is the European Communities, but as some articles do, this paper will refer to the
European Union. See Donald R. Dinan, An Analysis of the United States—Cuba “Havana Club” Rum Case Before the World
Trade Organization, 26 Fordham Int’l L.J. 337, 337 n. 1 (2003).
34Panel Report, European Communities—Protection of Trademarks and Geographical Indications for Agricultural Products
9the establishment of a WTO Dispute Panel,35 and the Dispute Settlement Body complied in October of the
same year.36
The United States brought two main claims against Regulation 2081/92: ﬁrst, that it did not comply with
national treatment obligations, and second, that it failed to protect U.S. trademarks.37 Jon Dudas, the Under
Secretary of Commerce for Intellectual Property and Director of the U.S. Patent and Trademark Oﬃce,
explained that his agency was “very concerned that owners of U.S. geographical indication certiﬁcation and
collective marks are excluded from the EC GI protection regime, merely because the United States has a
diﬀerent system for protecting GIs—through the trademark system.”38
In March 2005, the Panel released its ﬁnal report. The following sections will examine the Panel Report—
including the U.S. and EU arguments and the Panel’s conclusions.
A. The United States’ National Treatment Claims
The United States claimed that several provisions of Regulation 2081/92 were inconsistent with national
treatment obligations under TRIPS and the General Agreement on Tariﬀs and Trade 1994 (“GATT 1994”)
because they subjected non-EU WTO Members to “less favorable treatment.” These provisions included: 1)
the availability of GI protection to parties outside the European Union;39 2) application procedures for EU
and Foodstufss, ¶ 1.1, WT/DS174/R (Mar. 15, 2005) [hereinafter Panel Report]; United States Patent and Trademark Oﬃce,
Geographical Indications and Trademarks, http://www.uspto.gov/main/homepagenews/bak15mar2005.htm.
35Panel Report, supra note 34, ¶ 1.3; United States Patent and Trademark Oﬃce, supra note 34.
36Panel Report, supra note 34, ¶ 1.3. The Dispute Settlement Body established a single Panel in response to requests from
both the United States and Australia, which had also requested consultations with the European Union and a panel on the
issue of Regulation 2081/92. In 2004, the European Union requested that the Panel submit separate reports on the U.S. and
Australian claims. The United States and Australia did not comment on the request, and the Panel decided to grant it. Because
of close similarities between and mutual endorsements of their complaints, this paper will focus on the United States’, rather
than Australia’s, claims.
37See United States Patent and Trademark Oﬃce, supra note 34.
38Id.
39Panel Report, supra note 34, § VII.B.1.
10Member States and third countries;40 3) objection procedures;41 4) inspection procedures;42 and 5) labeling
requirements and treatment of homonymous names.43
1. Availability of Protection
The United States argued that Article 12(1) of Regulation 2081/9244 required a WTO Member that was
not a Member State of the European Union to adopt a system for GI protection equivalent to Regulation
2081/92 and to oﬀer reciprocal protection to European products, in order for that WTO Member to register
products under Regulation 2081/92.45 This requirement, the United States claimed, was inconsistent with
national treatment obligations under TRIPS Article 3.146 and GATT 1994 III:4.47 The principle of national
treatment obligations is fundamental to both TRIPS and GATT 1994. As the WTO Appellate Body stated
in the so-called “Havana Club” dispute between the United States and Cuba: “the national treatment
principle calls on WTO Members to accord no less favorable treatment to non-nationals than to nationals
in the ‘protection’ of trade-related intellectual property rights.”48 In this GI case, the United States put it





44Article 12(1) reads: “Without prejudice to international agreements, this Regulation may apply to an agricultural product
or foodstuﬀ from a third country provided that:
- the third country is able to give guarantees identical or equivalent to those referred to in Article 4,
- the third country concerned has inspection arrangements equivalent to those laid down in Article 10,
- the third country concerned is prepared to provide protection equivalent to that available in the Community to correspond-
ing agricultural products for foodstuﬀs coming from the Community.”
Regulation 2081/92, supra note 9, art. 12(1).
45Panel Report, supra note 34, ¶ 7.38.
46Id. ¶ 7.104.
47Id. ¶ 7.219. GATT 1994 Article III:4 reads in part: “The products of the territory of any contracting party imported into
the territory of any other contracting party shall be accorded treatment no less favourable than that accorded to like products
of national origin in respect of all laws, regulations and requirements aﬀecting their internal sale, oﬀering for sale, purchase,
transportation, distribution or use.”
48United States—Section 211 Omnibus Appropriations Act of 1998, Jan. 2, 2002, ¶ 243, WTO Doc. WT/DS176/AB/R.
11National treatment requires protection of the intellectual property of other Members’ nationals
regardless of how those other Members treat their own nationals. National treatment does not
allow a Member to require that other Members adopt particular standards or procedural rules as
a condition for protecting their nationals’ intellectual property. This is underscored by Article 1.1
of the TRIPS Agreement which provides that Members are not obligated to select any particular
means of implementation over another.49
According to the United States, third country nationals (speciﬁcally U.S. nationals) were subjected to less
favorable treatment under Regulation 2081/92 based on their nationality: they could not register their
home-based GIs in Europe unless their governments adopted an equivalent GI regulation system and granted
reciprocity to EU products, whereas EU nationals were free to register their GIs.50
Since no one had ever attempted to register a GI from outside Europe,51 the scope of application of Article
12(1) was left to debate and speculation in front of the WTO Dispute Panel. The EU response to the United
States’ position was that Article 12(1) did not in fact apply to WTO Members and that the use of the
prefatory phrase “without prejudice to international agreements” indicated so; the European Union argued
that under its regulation, WTO Members would be subject to the same conditions for GI registration as EU
countries.52
Despite this interpretation, the United States pressed the issue at the WTO because the European Union
had previously made public representations that Article 12(1) did in fact apply to WTO Members53 and
because the European Union’s position before the WTO would not constitute binding precedent if the issue
were contested in the future in the EU courts.54 Furthermore, the plain language of the article, the United
States feared, would not support the interpretation taken by the European Union before the WTO.55
50Id. ¶¶ 7.105 – 7.106.




55Id. ¶ 7.54. Eight third-party countries—Argentina, Brazil, Canada, China, Colombia, Mexico, New Zealand, and Chinese
Taipei—submitted arguments to the Panel agreeing with the United States that Article 12(1) applies to all third countries, not
12The European Union also argued that Article 12(1) did not discriminate based on nationality; it argued that
the distinction between geographical areas was related to the origin and area of production of the product,
not to the nationality of the producer.56
The Panel began its considerations by examining the regulation on its face and concluded that the article did
not distinguish between third countries and WTO Members in its provisions on applications procedures;57
thus Article 12(1)’s protection would be available to WTO Members only if they satisﬁed the requirements of
equivalence and reciprocity. The Panel’s conclusion was bolstered by other provisions in Regulation 2081/92
that involved “third countries” and did not draw distinctions between third countries and WTO Members.
The Panel pointed out that the European Union had interpreted one of these provisions as implicitly including
WTO Members; therefore, the Panel concluded there was no reason to believe the others did not as well.58
The Panel went on to say that even if the phrase “without prejudice to international agreements” had
the eﬀect claimed by the European Union—that of subjecting Article 12(1) to the TRIPS Agreement and
GATT 1994—that interpretation still would not cure the inconsistency with those international agreements.
Those agreements do not set forth their own procedures for registering GIs, and therefore non-EU WTO
Members seeking to register GIs in Europe would ultimately still be subject to the equivalence and reciprocity
requirements of Article 12(1).59
Next, the Panel considered whether Article 12(1) violated the national treatment obligations under TRIPS
just non-WTO Members, and that the phrase “without prejudice to international agreements” does not clearly exclude WTO
Members. Id. ¶¶ 7.44 – 7.51.
56Id. ¶ 7.112, 7.193. But the United States responded that “there is an extremely close ﬁt between a distinction based on
where a legal person is established and producing agricultural products and foodstuﬀs, and a distinction based on nationality.”
Id. ¶ 7.192.
57Id. ¶¶ 7.62 – 7.64, 7.102 – 7.103.
58Id. ¶ 7.67.
59Id. ¶ 7.65.
13and GATT 1994. In order to ﬁnd that a provision is inconsistent with TRIPS, it must be established, ﬁrst,
that there is an intellectual property right at issue, and second, that a WTO Member is giving less favorable
treatment to nationals of other WTO Members than to its own.60 The Panel looked to the national treatment
standard articulated in a 1989 GATT Panel Report: “The words ‘treatment no less favorable’ ...call for
eﬀective equality of opportunities for imported products in respect of the application of laws, regulations
and requirements aﬀecting the internal sale, oﬀering for sale, purchase, transportation, distribution or use
of products.”61 In concluding that the equivalence and reciprocity requirements of Article 12(1) accorded
diﬀerent, less favorable treatment to non-EU WTO Members, inconsistent with both TRIPS62 and GATT
1994,63 the Panel examined “eﬀective equality of opportunities” and placed signiﬁcant weight on two factors:
one, that third countries not recognized under Article 12(3) cannot get GI protection for their geographical
areas; and two, that equivalence and reciprocity create an “extra hurdle” (the establishment of GI protection
regimes and of international agreements for reciprocity) that non-EU countries must face in order to get GI
protection.64
2. Application Procedures
The United States’ second main claim was that the application procedures prescribed by Regulation 2081/92
were inconsistent with the European Union’s national treatment obligations because EU nationals seeking
to register EU GIs had a direct, less burdensome method of application than non-EU nationals seeking to
register home-based GIs from outside the European Union.65 EU Member States were legally obliged under
60Id. ¶ 7.125.
61GATT Panel Report, United States—Section 337 of the Tariﬀ Act of 1930, adopted Nov. 7, 1989, ¶ 5.11, BISD 36S/345.
62Panel Report, supra note 34, ¶ 7.213.
63Id. ¶ 7.238.
64Id. ¶ 7.139.
65As with the availability of protection, the application procedure was being challenged “as such,” since the United States
and the third-party countries that submitted comments reported that none of their nationals had attempted to register an
application through their governments.
14the regulation to apply for registration on an applicant’s behalf, while non-EU governments were under no
legal obligation to ﬁle a registration application.66 Additionally, governments seeking to register non-EU GIs
would have to make complex determinations (such as whether the application met the requirements listed
in the registration and whether that GI is protected in the home country), in addition to merely transmit-
ting paperwork.67 Instead of requiring participation by non-EU governments, the United States advocated
establishing a regime in which individual applicants could ﬁle directly with the controlling authority, the
Commission.68
The European Union responded by arguing that the burden on non-EU governments was the same as on EU
governments and thus not “less favorable”; that individual countries were best able to determine whether a GI
should be protected, and the determination was not an overly burdensome process; and that the application
procedure in fact was a sign of deference to the sovereignty of other nations to make the determination.69
In considering this claim, the Panel examined the fact that EU nationals seeking to register EU GIs have a
right to their governments’ processing of their GI applications, while non-EU nationals seeking to register
non-EU GIs do not. Regulation 2018/92 obliges EU Member States to establish systems to handle GI
applications, but third countries are under no such obligation; thus when a third country national submits
an application to his government, the government is not obliged to handle the application, and that applicant
faces an “extra hurdle.”70 Whether non-EU nationals have access to the application procedure in the ﬁrst
place is beyond the EU’s control since the EU has implicitly delegated the initial phase to governments that
66Panel Report, supra note 34, ¶ 7.244.
67Id. ¶ 7.246.
68Id. ¶ 7.301. The United States noted that other WTO Members used direct application procedures, and that a direct
application would be consistent with WTO obligations. Id.
69Id. ¶ 7.248 – 7.249.
70Id. ¶¶ 7.271 – 7.272.
15are not under any obligation to comply (in contrast to EU Member States, to which the European Union is
entitled to delegate certain functions).
The Panel also questioned the validity of the European Union’s argument that individual countries are best
situated to evaluate whether the application has met the regulation’s requirements; it noted that when the
Commission evaluates whether an application warrants publication, it must perform that same evaluation, so
the requirement on the national government seems redundant, especially when the it is a non-EU government
called upon to determine compliance with EU law.71
3. Objection Procedures
Similarly, the United States argued that the objection procedures accorded less favorable treatment to non-
EU nationals because those individuals lacked a direct means of objecting to registrations, as compared to
EU nationals. While Regulation 2081/92 obliges EU governments to verify and transmit objections, non-EU
countries have no such obligation.72 The United States further argued that the language of the regulation
limited potential objectors to those whose governments met the equivalence and reciprocity requirements for
GI protection and imposed a stricter standing requirement on non-EU nationals (“legitimate interest”) than
on EU nationals (“legitimately concerned”).73
The European Union justiﬁed its objection procedures by saying that the veriﬁcation was limited to conﬁrm-
ing that the objector was a resident or commercial establishment in the country and that the government’s
71Id. ¶ 7.303.
72Id. ¶¶ 7.313 – 7.315. Third parties submitted comments supporting the U.S. position. Brazil and Mexico both considered
the objection procedures as imposing a costly, extra burden on objectors from non-EU countries. Id. ¶¶ 7.321 – 7.322. New
Zealand raised the possibility that the objection procedures would eﬀectively deter non-EU objectors from ﬁling objections,
thus depriving them of the right to object to the loss of a valuable intellectual property right. Id. ¶ 7.323.
73Panel Report, supra note 34, ¶¶ 7.313 – 7.316. The United States referred to dictionary deﬁnitions that deﬁne “concern”
more broadly than “interest.” Id. ¶ 7.316.
16capacity as the oﬃcial contact person would beneﬁt the objector because dealing with one’s own government
would be easier than dealing directly with the European authority.74 The European Union also denied that
the requirements for standing were diﬀerent; it contended that “concern” and “interest” were substantively
the same.75
The Panel considered the United States case against the veriﬁcation and transmission requirements to be even
stronger for the objections procedure than for the application procedure. While the application procedure
drew distinctions based on the country of origin of the product (i.e. an applicant must apply through the
government where the GI is based, which would practically disadvantage non-EU nationals more than EU
nationals), the objection procedure explicitly drew distinctions based on the country of origin of the objector
(i.e. the objector must ﬁle his objection through his or its own government).76 Thus the requirement that
an objector ﬁle an objection through his or its government accorded less favorable treatment to non-EU
nationals because of the extra governmental hurdle. However, the Panel disagreed with the United States’
claims that objection procedures were available only to nationals of countries that meet the equivalence and
reciprocity requirements for GI protection77 and that the standing requirements were more strict for non-EU
nationals than EU nationals.78 It concluded that the United States had not made a prima facie case with





77Id. ¶¶ 7.348 – 7.350.
78After examining dictionary deﬁnitions and usage in other provisions, the Panel concluded that “legitimate interest” and
“legitimate concern” had identical meanings and that if the European Court of Justice were to interpret the regulation, it
would do so in a way that was consistent with international law—i.e. it would interpret them as having identical substantive
meanings. Panel Report, supra note 34, ¶¶ 7.356 – 7.362. It also pointed to the European Union’s own interpretation of the
two terms as identical, despite having disregarded the European Union’s interpretation earlier in the section on availability of
protection. Id. ¶ 7.362.
17The United States claimed that the requirement that countries have inspection structures in place is in-
consistent with national treatment obligations. There were two main arguments advanced by the United
States. First, the United States argued that the regulation demanded government participation by other
WTO Members in a way that was inconsistent with national treatment obligations. Regulation 2081/92
requires EU countries to have the Article 10 inspection structures in place, while non-EU WTO Members
are under no such obligation; thus EU nationals who apply for GI protection will be able to satisfy the
inspection procedure requirements, but non-EU nationals will not necessarily be able to.79
The second argument pertained to the prescriptive nature of the regulation. The United States claimed that
the regulation went beyond merely requiring inspection to in fact forcing other WTO Members to adopt
the inspection procedures used by the European Union. While there was no dispute over the fact that the
European Union had the right to require that an applicant inspect and control the speciﬁc GI at issue,
the phrasing of the regulation was more broad than that. It required that there be a permanent general
inspection system with oversight over all products, and it described the particulars of such a system, such
as the requirement to have a full qualiﬁed staﬀ.80
As it did on the prior claims, the Panel decided in favor of the United States on the government participation
ground: applicants seeking to register GIs from non-EU countries faced the extra hurdle of petitioning those
governments to carry out the inspection requirements of the regulation.81 However, the Panel disagreed with
the United States’ claim that the regulation was prescriptive in a way that was inconsistent with national
treatment. The Panel ﬁrst pointed out that the inspection procedures prescribed for both within and outside
the European Union were formally almost identical.82 While this fact alone was not dispositive, the Panel




18emphasized that the determination of less favorable treatment is based on the WTO Member’s treatment
of its own nationals compared to its treatment of the nationals of other Members.83 Furthermore, the
establishment of inspection procedures did not need to adhere to strict requirements, nor did it need to be
speciﬁcally devoted to conducting inspections under this regulation.84
5. Labeling Requirements for Homonymous Names
The United States’ last national treatment claim pertained to the provision on labeling requirements in cases
where a protected name of a non-EU country was homonymous with a protected EU name under Regulation
2081/92. The United States believed that the requirement that the “country of origin [be] clearly and visibly
indicated on the label” applied only to the non-EU name,85 and that such labeling imposed an unequal burden
on non-EU products (from both the mere act of labeling and additional costs), as well as implying that non-
EU products were not the “true” GIs.86 The European Union denied the U.S. interpretation of the article.
Rather, it argued, the provision applied to both the non-EU and the EU product,87 and whichever product
was registered second would be the one to bear the country of origin label.88 Furthermore, the European
Union argued that truthful labeling should not constitute less favorable treatment.89
The Panel began by interpreting the clause “use of such names”90 to determine whether that phrase encom-
passed only the GIs from non-EU countries (as the United States argued) or both the non-EU and the EU
GIs (as the European Union argued). The Panel concluded, in favor of the United States, that “such names”
83Id. ¶ 7.413.
84Id. ¶ 7.415.
85Id. ¶ 7.466. This was another instance of a requirement that had never been applied in practice, so the interpretation was
left open to debate in front of the WTO Panel. Id. ¶ 7.472.
86Panel Report, supra note 34, ¶ 7.482.
87Id. ¶¶ 7.468 – 7.469.
88Id. ¶ 7.469.
89Id. ¶ 7.483.
90Regulation 2081/92, supra note 9, art. 12(2).
19referred only to the subject of the preceding sentence: “a protected name of a third country.”91
Next, the Panel examined Article 6(6), the language of which was nearly identical to that of Article 12(2).92
Article 6(6) applies when GI protection is sought for “a homonym of an already registered name from the
European Union or a third country recognised in accordance with the procedure in Article 12(3).”93 In
such cases, “the use of a registered homonymous name shall be subject to there being a clear distinction in
practice between the homonym registered subsequently and the name already on the register, having regard
to the need to treat the producers concerned in an equitable manner and not to mislead consumers.”94
The Panel noted that both Articles 6(6) and 12(2) were mandatory and that the European Union could
implement Article 6(6) by requiring the clear and visible label with country of origin required by Article
12(2)—indeed, the European Union noted that a country of origin label would be necessary to meet the
Article 6(6) requirement of a “clear distinction.”95 Consequently, the Panel concluded that there was no
diﬀerence in treatment under this labeling requirement.
B. The United States’ Trademark Claims
The United States’ second main claim at the WTO was that Regulation 2081/92 prevented existing trade-
mark owners from enforcing their trademarks in cases where similar or identical names sought GI protection
that would result in confusion with the prior trademark.96
The Panel’s inquiry began by examining whether Regulation 2081/92 placed limitations on prior trademark
91Id. art. 12(2).
92Article 12(2) was in the original version of the Council Regulation, but Article 6(6) was added by amendment in 2003.
Council Regulation (EC) No. 692/2003, 2003, O.J. (L 99).
93Regulation 2081/92, supra note 9, art. 6(6).
94Id. art. 6(6).
95Panel Report, supra note 34, ¶ 7.496.
96Id. ¶ 7.512.
20owners, and thus it focused on Article 14, which governs the relationship of trademarks and GIs. The Panel
interpreted Article 14(2) as an exception to the regulation’s GI protections in Article 13,97 and concluded
that Article 14(2) allows continued use of a prior trademark even if such use conﬂicts with those protections,
as long as that trademark existed before the date that the GI’s registration application was submitted.
However, the prior trademark owner cannot exercise his rights against someone who uses a GI protected by
Regulation 2081/92.98
The European Union argued that the provisions of Article 14(3) would prevent the registration of a GI that
would curb a prior trademark owner’s rights under Article 14(2); in other words, Article 14(3) would prevent
the registration of any GI likely to cause confusion with a prior trademark. Article 14(3) reads:
A designation of origin or geographical indication shall not be registered where, in the light of a
trade mark’s reputation and renown and the length of time it has been used, registration is liable
to mislead the consumer as to the true identity of the product.99
The Panel disagreed with the EU interpretation. It noted ﬁrst that registration would be refused only if the
GI would be misleading as to a single issue—“the true identity of the product”—and not to anything else.100
Second, while the provision might protect trademarks with a “strong reputation, wide renown and long
use,” it does not include trademarks “with no reputation, renown or use.”101 Third, the Panel noted that
the standard used in this provision—“liable to mislead”—is narrower than the standard used elsewhere in
the regulation—“likelihood of confusion.”102 Based on these observations, the Panel concluded that Article
14(3) did not prevent the potential restriction on a trademark owner’s rights that could occur under Article
14(2).
97These protections are negative, rather than positive, rights—against the four categories of encroachments, listed in Article
13(1).
98Panel Report, supra note 34, ¶¶ 7.526, 7.527, 7.556.
100Panel Report, supra note 34, ¶ 7.559.
101Id. ¶ 7.560.
102Id. ¶ 7.561.
21The next main issue in the United States’ trademark claim was whether the TRIPS Agreement requires the
European Union, as a WTO Member, to allow prior trademark owners’ enforcement of rights against the
use of registered GIs. The United States argued that it does, and that under TRIPS Article 16.1, these
rights are exclusive and valid against third parties, including identical or similar signs, such as GIs.103 The
European Union countered by arguing that GIs are protected intellectual property rights on the same level
as trademarks under TRIPS104 and that TRIPS Article 24.5 provides for the coexistence of GIs with prior
trademarks.105
The Panel concluded that Article 24.5 creates an exception to GI protection, not a limitation, as the European
Union argued, on trademark owners’ rights to exclude.106 Moreover, the Panel found that the right provided
for in Article 16.1 is unqualiﬁedly an exclusive right, with the only exception being that the right will
not prejudice any existing prior rights.107 Thus to the extent TRIPS requires WTO Members to permit
trademark owners to exercise their rights against uses as GIs, the limitation of that right under Regulation
2081/92 Article 14(2) is inconsistent with the European Union’s international obligations.
103Id. ¶ 7.577. Article 16.1 reads: “The owner of a registered trademark shall have the exclusive right to prevent all third
parties not having the owner’s consent from using in the course of trade identical or similar signs for goods or services which
are identical or similar to those in respect of which the trademark is registered where such use would result in a likelihood of
confusion. In case of the use of an identical sign for identical goods or services, a likelihood of confusion shall be presumed.
The rights described above shall not prejudice any existing prior rights, nor shall they aﬀect the possibility of Members making
rights available on the basis of use.” TRIPS Agreement, supra note 1, art. 16.1.
104Panel Report, supra note 34, ¶ 7.583.
105Coexistence “refer[s] to a legal regime under which a GI and a trademark can both be used concurrently to some extent
even though the use of one or both of them would otherwise infringe the rights conferred by the other.” Panel Report, supra
note 34, ¶ 7.514. See TRIPS Article 24.5, which reads:
Where a trademark has been applied for or registered in good faith, or where rights to a trademark have been acquired
through use in good faith either:
(a) before the date of application of these provisions in that Member as deﬁned in Part IV; or
(b) before the geographical indication is protected in its country of origin;
measures adopted to implement this Section shall not prejudice eligibility for or the validity of the registration of a trademark,
or the right to use a trademark, on the basis that such treatment is identical with, or similar to, a geographical indication.
TRIPS Agreement, supra note 1, art. 24.5.
106Panel Report, supra note 34, ¶¶ 7.615.
107Id. ¶¶ 7.602 – 7.603.
22Finally, the European Union argued that its GI protection regime fell under TRIPS Article 17’s “limited
exception” to the trademark rights conferred in Article 16.1.108 Both parties agreed that a limited exception
means a small dimunition of rights.109 Examining the ways in which Regulation 2081/92 could curtail
trademark owners’ rights, the Panel concluded that under the regulation, trademarks could continue to
be used, though the owners’ right to prevent confusing uses was diminished with respect to the use of GIs
protected by 2081/92.110 This curtailment was within the scope of Article 17’s limited exception, and it took
account of the “legitimate interests” of the trademark owner because of the regulation’s objection procedures
and provisions for refusing registration where it would jeopardize the existence of a trademark111 or where
the GI is likely to mislead consumers given a trademark’s reputation, renown, and long use.112
III. The Aftermath of the WTO Panel Report and the European Response:
Regulation 510/2006
The Dispute Settlement Body adopted the Panel Report on April 20, 2005, but there continued to be
debate over which side prevailed at the WTO.113 The United States claimed that the Report supported
its conclusions about Europe’s discriminatory GI regime and opened access to registration to American
food processors,114 while the European Union cited the Report’s conﬁrmation of the validity of GI regimes
coexisting with trademark protection. Peter Mandelson, the EU Commissioner for Trade, described the
108Article 17’s subject heading is “Exceptions.” It reads: “Members may provide limited exceptions to the rights conferred
by a trademark, such as fair use of descriptive terms, provided that such exceptions take account of the legitimate interests of
the owner of the trademark and of third parties.” TRIPS Agreement, supra note 1, art. 17.
109Panel Report, supra note 34, ¶ 7.650.
110Id. ¶ 7.659.
111Regulation 2081/92, supra note 9, art. 7(4).
112Id. art. 14(3).
113See, e.g., William New, Both Sides Claim Victory in Geographical Indications Dispute (Mar. 3, 2005), http://www.ip-
watch.org/weblog/index.php?p=30&res=1024&print=0; OUT-LAW News, WTO Rules on EU Regional Trade Mark Policy
Disputes (Mar. 16, 2005), http://www.out-law.com/page-5387; Ahuja’s World Patent & Trademark News, Europe Complies
with WTO Geographical Indications Ruling, http://www.wptn.com/Mailing/Jan 18/details/GI/1.html (last visited Apr. 24,
2006).
114See United States Patent and Trademark Oﬃce, supra note 34; Press Release, Oﬃce of the United States Trade Represen-
tative, United States Wins “Food Name” Case in WTO Against EU (Mar. 15, 2005).
23decision as “conﬁrming that Geographical Indications are both legal and compatible with existing trademark
systems, [and] this WTO decision will help the EU ensure wider recognition of Geographical Indications and
protection of regional and local product identities.”115 Nonetheless, it was up to the European Union to
amend its regulation to comply with the Panel’s ﬁndings,116 and it was given until April 3, 2006 to comply.117
In response to the WTO Panel Report, the European Commission adopted two proposals to clarify and
streamline the GI registration procedures.118 The Commission believed that these proposals would comply
with the WTO’s rulings and would “bring the scheme into conformity on the two areas that were criticised:
ﬁrstly by formally deleting the requirement for ‘reciprocity and equivalence’ from the regulations and secondly
by allowing third country operators to submit applications and objections directly rather than through their
governments.”119
On March 20, 2006, the Council of Ministers adopted an amended version of the Commission’s proposals
in the form of Regulation 510/2006, which formally repealed Regulation 2081/92.120 Although much of the
language of the new regulation was identical to that of Regulation 2081/92, amendments were made along the
lines proposed by the Commission in its proposals on WTO compliance. For example, the Council repealed
the provisions requiring equivalence and reciprocity from non-EU governments, as well as those requiring
the active participation of non-EU governments (such as the veriﬁcation and transmission requirements for
115Press Release, European Commission, Origin Labeling—WTO Panel Upholds EU System of Protection of “Geographical
Indications” (Mar. 15, 2005).
116The Panel Report “recommend[ed] ...that the European Communities bring the Regulation into conformity with the
TRIPS Agreement and GATT 1994.” Panel Report, supra note 34, ¶ 8.4.
117See WTO, Dispute Settlement—the Disputes—DS174, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop e/dispu e/cases e/ds174 e.htm.
118See Press Release, European Commission, Commission Proposes Improved Rules on Agricultural Quality Products (Jan.
4, 2006) (“In order to make the registration process more eﬃcient, the Commission is proposing to simplify procedures and
clarify the role of Member States.”).
119Id.
120Regulation 510/2006, supra note 10, art. 19.
24applications and objections) in order to have access to registration procedures.121 The regulation left open
the possibility that non-EU governments would voluntarily choose to assume responsibility for verifying and
transmitting applications and objections.122
The main innovation proposed by the Commission and adopted by the Council was the creation of a “single
document” for GI applications. In the Explanatory Memorandum to its proposals, the Commission described
its “ﬁrst amendment priority” as:
deﬁning more clearly the key information to be oﬃcially published prior to registration .... This
information, which is contained in a single document, covers inter alia the actual name, a description
of the product for veriﬁcation, labeling and presentation purposes (including, in this respect, any
packaging restrictions outside the area of origin and the justiﬁcation for such restrictions), and proof
of the link between the product and its geographical origin. A standardised, comprehensive presen-
tation of those elements will make it possible to ensure greater homogeneity and equal treatment
for applications, while guaranteeing that all the elements which are to be made fully transparent to
operators located outside the deﬁned areas are mentioned.123
The proposal for the single document was adopted by the Council, and is provided for in Regulation 510/2006
Article 5(3),124 which lays out the elements of a registration application, including what information should
be provided in the single document. This detailed list is in contrast to Article 5 of Regulation 2081/92,
which referred generally to an application without describing its contents except to say that it included the
product speciﬁcation of Article 4. Regulation 510/2006 then creates separate application procedures for
names relating to areas within the European Union and those relating to areas outside. In the case of the
former, Article 5(4) directs applicants to submit their applications to the Member States where the areas
are located.125 In the case of the latter, Article 5(9) directs applicants to submit their applications directly
121Commission Proposal for a Council Regulation on the Protection of Geographical Indications and Designations of Origin
for Agricultural Products and Foodstuﬀs, Explanatory Memorandum ¶ 9, COM (2005) 698 ﬁnal (Jan. 5, 2006).
122Id., ¶ 9.
124Regulation 510/2006, supra note 10, art. 5(3).
125Id. art. 5(4).
25to the Commission.126 In this way, the new regulation is designed to empower applicants, particularly those
seeking registration of names outside the European Union, by making the application requirements and the
application procedure more transparent and direct.127
The “second amendment priority” was clarifying what functions and responsibilities are allocated to the
Commission and to the Member States.128 These changes had little direct relevance, however, to the sub-
stance of the WTO complaints.
One diﬀerence not highlighted by the Commission in the Explanatory Memorandum was an alteration to the
protection of prior trademark rights with respect to similar or identical PDOs and PGIs. While Regulation
2081/92 allowed the continued use of prior trademarks that had been “applied for, registered, or established
by use ...before either the date of protection [of the designation of origin or geographical indication] in
the country of origin or the date of submission to the Commission of the application for registration,”
Regulation 510/2006 modiﬁed this cut-oﬀ date to “before either the date of protection of the designation
of origin or geographical indication in the country of origin or before 1 January 1996.”129 Thus, under the
new regulation, if a trademark was not “applied for, registered, or established by use” before 1996, it might




127To further assist this goal of applicant empowerment, the Commission also published an internet guide with the forms
necessary for registering applications.
128Commission Proposal, supra note 121, ¶¶ 7 – 8.
129Compare Regulation 2081/92, supra note 9, art. 14(2) with Regulation 510/2006, supra note 10, art. 14(2) (emphasis
added).
130Regulation 510/2006, supra note 10, art. 13.
26As Regulation 510/2006 was passed just a few weeks ago, it is still unclear how this most recent stage of
the U.S.-EU battle over GIs will play out. The author of this paper suspects that 510/2006 will do little
to appease the concerns of the United States over what it deems to be protectionist, trademark-violating
European GI policies. The Commission and Council of Ministers appear to have done the bare minimum in
terms of amending Regulation 2081/92 to comply with the WTO Panel Report, and the United States, with
its free-market, open-competition stance is not likely to see the new regulation as truly opening the doors of
Europe to competition from American products.
While the United States views the Panel Report as a victory against EU discriminatory policies, the European
Union views it as a validation of separate GI protection regimes, bolstering the European Union’s arguments
for stronger GI protection at the WTO/international level.131 Interestingly, although one of the EU goals is
clearly to protect European producers, some European industry groups—including the Confederation of the
Food and Drink Industries of the European Union (“CIAA”)—are criticizing the EU regulation. The CIAA,
for one, argues that the large number of registrations permitted by the regulation—approximately 700 names
are registered currently, and 300 applications are under review—undermines the credibility of the system
as a quality assurance regime.132 Instead, the CIAA advocates leaving quality assurance to the private
sector, through voluntary schemes implemented by the food industry, while the public sector focuses on
131The European Union has proposed recognizing this GI standard at the international level. “The EU describes the current
state of GI protection under TRIPS Article 22 as ‘clearly insuﬃcient,’ and proposes to strengthen it through ‘TRIPS-plus’
protection. The EU recommends extending protection to GIs even when no risk of consumer confusion exists, providing for a
multilateral registration for all GIs ...and perhaps most harmful to the United States’ interests, ‘asking WTO members, for a
selected group of [GIs] of signiﬁcant economic and trade value, to remove prior trademarks and, [if] necessary, grant protection
for EU GIs that were previously used or have become generic’ so that GI products can gain market access.” Zacher, supra note
3, at 454 – 55.
132Foodproductiondaily.com, Quality Schemes Should Remain Voluntary, EU Food Industry Says (Apr. 4, 2006),
http://www.foodproductiondaily.com/news/ng.asp?n=67021-ciaa-quality-geographical-indications.
27food safety issues.133 Its argument reﬂects stereotypically U.S.-style “free market” principles about limiting
government regulation and relying on the market and consumer choice to promote industry self-regulation.
This development perhaps signals that Europe will begin to feel pressure from within to scale back its GI
regulatory scheme.
133Id.
28